Address to a Joint Session of the US Congress

Mr. Speaker!

Senator Mitchell!

Mr. Michel!

Senator Dole!

Mr. Gephardt!

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am very conscious of the honor of being invited to speak before your distinguished body. I will take this occasion to share with you some of my thinking on problems which, as I see it, are important for both of us.

First let me say the following. It seems to me that, in discussing the changes which have occurred, especially in the past few years, although we recognize their magnitude and importance, we do not yet fully appreciate that we already live in a different world.

Our consciousness, even when focusing on major changes, in many respects continues to move along well-trodden paths, filtering new realities through the sieve of traditional values and concepts.

This is also true of those who carry the burden of political decisions. Perhaps for that reason these decisions are often, to say the least, inadequate and bear the stamp of earlier approaches, creating obstacles to a subsequent positive unfolding of change. This is encountered in both foreign and domestic policy.

Hence the pressing need to think in a new way. Sometimes the expression, New Thinking, is taken merely as an invitation to a new foreign policy. I interpret it in a much broader sense. To have a truly new policy one must evaluate the changing realities correctly. And this, in turn, demands an often painful break with previous conclusions, evaluations, sympathies, and antipathies. If this is not done, there will inevitably be miscalculations and abrupt changes of policy, which are always dangerous.

I felt a great sense of satisfaction in reading the speeches of President Bush in the Rose Garden, on April 21, and of Secretary of State Baker in Chicago, April 22. I realized that they were rethinking the course of world events, in these genuinely changed circumstances, in a truly new way and on a truly large scale. Although I cannot accept everything they say about "American leadership," I was very impressed by their interpretation of U.S. interests, including economic, and of national security as closely linked to support for democracy in Russia and the other states of the former USSR.

Another theme I would like to mention is the problem of national interests in an international world. This seems to me exceptionally important. today.

There is no point trying to demonstrate that states will now neglect their national interest in favor of something else, or even less that they will reject national interest altogether. National interest still dominates the formulation of foreign policy and its implementation. But at the same time, we must take into consideration the new processes in the world.

These are: interdependence, the integration and unity of the world, and the fact that challenges are global in scale.

They dictate the need for other priorities, as part of a true policy based on realities.

But such a policy must be premised on the idea that the very content of national interest itself has changed. This is a point I would particularly stress. Indeed, can the interest of any country, even more, a great power, be considered as given once and for all and absolutely unchanging? One recalls what the ancient Greeks stated in this connection. It is good that today, at the beginning of a new era and a time of fundamental change in both Europe and the world, the idea is becoming increasingly accepted that the very system of national priorities and mechanisms of their implementation, are also undergoing alteration.

Politicians also bear responsibility for ensuring that nations have a correct understanding of their interests -- their vital interests. We know from our own experience how we could be carried away, for instance, by the ideologically rooted conviction that the Soviet Union had a vital interest in maintaining a military presence in some country of equatorial Africa. I think that the United States has had equivalent "experience" of this sort.

The national priority is the supreme interest of the state, the nation, and the peoples comprising it. It is neither easily ascertained nor precisely defined. But to confuse it with the momentary or selfish demands of some domestic group or class, even a very influential one, is dangerous, whether the demands originate in the economy, the military-industrial complex, or in some political party.

President Bush and I on several occasions had very far-ranging discussions on this point. We tried to find our way in the very delicate problem of what sorts of relations between our countries correspond to the genuine national interests of both one and the other side, as well as of both together -- meaning, also those of the international community. These musings were not without their impact on our policies vis-a-vis one another. They yielded very definite results. Naturally, I would hope that this not be lost to the interrelationship between the American and Russian leadership.

In general terms, I would say the following about the international priorities of a sensible contemporary foreign policy corresponding to the common interests of all. These must include: -- the continuing improvement of international relations; -- unifying our efforts to remove threats to the environment in which we live; -- cooperation to assure energy and food supplies; -- interaction in the disarmament process; -- the promotion of democratic transformation and protection for human rights.

My trip around the United States has shown how much interest is manifested by the most varied groups in American society with respect to everything occurring in our country, especially in Russia.

The CIS is a more of a formal structure in the sense that the countries emerging through the breakup of the USSR must seek some sort of formula for integration. Otherwise, most of them will not only have extreme difficulty emerging from the crisis in isolation, but thereafter they will find themselves on the margin of global processes.

At present, however, the situation is confused. The United States has to deal with a number of different states on the territory of the former USSR.

It is also obvious that among these states the Russian Federation comes first in the system of foreign-policy priorities. I do not say this because I am a citizen of that state but rather because of certain indisputable facts which must be taken into consideration. Russia is legally recognized as the successor state to the USSR; it has taken the latter's seat in the United Nations Security Council. Russia is a major nuclear power. And even the sharp reduction in its defense does not relegate it to the sidelines. Even in its altered form, Russia remains territorially the largest country in the world. It has a population of 150 million people. It possesses enormous natural resources, a highly skilled labor force, a gigantic, even if antiquated, industrial potential, and outstanding scientific personnel in many areas.

Today the Russian Federation is in severe difficulty. But foreign policy, after all, should be directed not only at today, but also at tomorrow. Russia tomorrow -- and that day will come -- will be a large and flourishing state whose impact on the world will be on a scale with its mighty potential.

In the relations between our countries much will depend upon the steps which are taken today. And judging by what I have learned from the recent statements of your President and Secretary of State on on this very theme, such understanding does exist. Therefore I would like to tell you how I envisage these relations.

After 1985 major positive shifts occurred in the relations between the USSR and the USA. Today we must not forget what was gained during those years and, indeed, we must develop them further.

In general terms, I repeat, this necessity is understood, and statements to this effect have been made on both sides. But, as is well known, statements are not enough. The real obstacles come to the surface when something concrete is attempted. As the proverb states: "the devil hides in the details." For instance, much very exacting work must be done to analyze and confirm a number of agreements which were made with the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the series of agreements on disarmament. The obligations assumed by the Soviet Union must be carried out by all the states members of the CIS, without any exceptions.

This applies especially to nuclear weapons. But the problem is different today from what it was when these particular agreements were concluded. The nature of the nuclear threat has altered in principle. Now the major danger is not that there will be an exchange of nuclear strikes by global opponents, but rather that control over these weapons will be lost.

The reduction in the accumulated potential must continue. That much is clear. The ultimate goal remains a nuclear-free world. but prior to that moment, and it may be a long time coming, supplementary non-proliferation guarantees will be needed.

For many years world public opinion has been concerned that countries which are not signatories to the non-proliferation treaty nay be working to develop nuclear weapons. Anxiety on this score has intensified since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world breathed a sigh of relief when agreement was reached to concentrate all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on Russian territory and to establish a centralized mechanism of command and control over strategic weapons.

But the increasingly tense relationship among the "nuclear" republics has given rise to some uncertainty as to whether the agreement will be carried out. I think that the United States and Russia should jointly keep this problem under control until there is a full guarantee that it has once and for all been removed from the agenda.

The world press has recently written a great deal about the threat of an unravelling of nuclear technology through emigration by Soviet scientists and other specialists in this area. I must say that what has been written on this subject is full of exaggerations. There has not yet been any mass exodus of our nuclear and rocket specialists, and those who do leave generally head for countries like the USA, England, France, etc. where nuclear technology is already on a high level. But there is indeed a potential danger of such emigration if only because the press campaign, so to speak, tells those who are hunting for nuclear weapons what address to write to.

I welcome the measures undertaken by the USA and Russia, and also the initiative of President Mitterand, to prevent such a turn of events. Even so, I cannot conceal my feeling that the measures proposed are inadequate. Large scale international research programs must be developed immediately which could provide work for most of the physicists who will be losing their jobs, including both Russians and Americans.

Up until now I have been calling Russia the successor state to the Soviet Union, but this is only one side of the coin. The Russian Federation has been recognized as a new state with its own specific national geopolitical and economic interests, foreign-policy priorities, and problems.

Also in the defense sphere, Russia will have to solve its new national security problem. It has the right to count on understanding from America and NATO.

One problem which is assuming an acute and, at times, dramatic character in Russia is that of ethnic enclaves which, thanks to the breakup of the formerly unified state organism, are being violently separated from their accustomed Motherland and now find themselves on the other side of a national boundary. This is true, first and foremost, of Russians, but also of other nationalities which are organically connected with Russian culture, the Russian language, and the Russian way of life.

The situation is aggravated by the paroxysms of extreme nationalism which have here and there generated direct discrimination against minorities. Sometimes this is carried to a point which resembles apartheid.

In this situation any incautious step by anyone, however well-intentioned, can be misinterpreted and used in a way which is contrary to what was anticipated. And, of course, any actions which contradict extraterritorial principles of human rights should be called by their true name. Assistance here by the US, the UN, or the European Community would be no less significant than the West's humanitarian food assistance.

We must also realize that no Russian government can ignore discrimination against a Russian-speaking population, especially when this leads to armed clashes and the creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees. If the democrats cannot resolve this problem, it will be resolved by totalitarian nationalists. It can hardly be in the interests of the United States not to consider this circumstance in its relations with Russia and the other states of the CIS.

The related, but broader, issue of European instability must also be considered. The United States has its obligations in Europe and cannot just turn its back on them. For Russia, European stability is an absolutely vital issue which affects it directly. In this way, life itself obliges us to take common actions. We must move more rapidly to create a system of European conciliation, arbitration, and, if need be, even measures of compulsion to prevent or to end conflicts. In this connection I fully support the proposal to set up a sort of European Security Council endowed with broad powers. I think such a step would be fully in the interests of the United States as well.

Russia in its European policy can never ignore the danger of becoming isolated from Central and Western Europe. Such a tendency can already be seen in outline. On Russia's western boundaries a chain of countries has emerged which can either become a bridge or a wall between Russia and the rest of Europe. Both Russia's geographic interests and the needs of Russian democracy demand rapprochement with these countries. Isolating Russia, and squeezing it off into the East, is in the interests neither of the United States nor of Western Europe.

The Russian Federation must still work out some new type of relationship with the former Central Asian republics. In our country and in the West there is today much speculation about the growing danger from a politicized Moslem fundamentalism. I consider this to be exaggerated. In any case, history, economic interdependence, and many psychological, cultural, and political factors reflecting a century of closeness between the peoples of Central Asia and Russia, suggest that the effect of liberation from the "shackles of imperialism" will inevitably die down and that rapprochement on a new basis will then take place on a voluntary and natural basis. But for this to happen there must be a policy which has been thought through in all its details, especially on the part of Russia itself. Here a substantial role may be allotted to the relations, based upon contemporary democratic principles, of the United States and the other major Western powers with the countries of Central Asia. What Washington has already undertaken along these lines seems to me to be acceptable.

It is obvous that the interests of the USA and the Russian Federation in this area are close.

The area of contact of these interests includes problems of global security, of regional policy in the Middle East, in the Asia-Pacific Region, and also in Latin America and Africa. I discussed this matter some days ago in New York.

In conclusion, you will doubtless have noted that the basic thrust of my speech favors a partnership of equal rights and equal benefits between the United States and Russia. Of course, I realize that some in the United States feel that your interests are better served by a weak and dismembered Russia, one which has been reduced to a secondary position in world affairs. I will not polemicize with this viewpoint but would just like to formulate what seem to me two important propositions.

The first: is it sensible to put an insoluble task at the center of one's policy? After all, Russia cannot be permanently kept, so to speak, "offside" in world politics. Any such attempt would be hopeless. All they could do would be to harm Russian democracy and maybe scuttle it for good.

The second proposition: can the United States really get along without a good and rather reliable partner in its highly moral and intelligent foreign policy? Russia can become such a partner. There is no difference of view today between it and the United States on the basic problems of human existence. Geopolitically it is not in opposition to the United States. Nor is it a competitor. It has no real interest in that and it lacks any immediate motivation. In any case, the "superpower era" will presumably fade further and further into the past.

And if these considerations are true, it is in the American interest to extend genuine support to the reforms in Russia. Today they are in their most difficult stage, and we have not yet gone through the worst of the crisis.

The people are courageously bearing up under their burdens because they do not want a return to the past. But in the very near future we must pass through even more severe trials and make some difficult decisions. This is connected, first and foremost, with the liberalization of energy prices.

I would ask the members of both chambers of Congress, when the decision is taken on the Administration's proposal to support reforms in my country, to bear in mind how much is staked on this card. I hope that Congress will follow its best traditions of bipartisanship and responsibility. This is a historical moment and a historical opportunity. We cannot afford to miss it.

It would not be superfluous to recall that even in the worst of times the Russians, and other peoples of my country, never felt hostility toward the American people. When Russia emerges from the present severe crisis, the national memory will forever remain cognizant of the magnanimity displayed by Americans at this moment of difficulty. This has happened before, more than once, especially at the end of the war with fascism. Of course, those feelings were at the time rapidly suppressed and swept away by the new wave of Stalinist moral, and even physical, terror. That could never happen again today.

All this leads me to state that the prospects are very good for rapprochement and cooperation beween a democratic Russia and America. And I am sincerely happy that in this chamber there are so many people ready to apply themselves to this task.

14 May 1992

Let us act together!!

Mikhail Gorbachev