Annual address of the Centre for Democratic Institutions

by Mikhail Gorbachev, May 31 1999

Introduce by: Roland Rich, foundation director, center for Democratic Institutions; Professor Deane Terrell, vice-chancellor, australian national university; And Alexander Downer, minister for foreign affairsChairman: Your Excellency, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev; the Honourable Alexander Downer; Vice-Chancellor, Professor Deane Terrell; honourable members and senators; excellencies; ladies and gentlemen: my name is Roland Rich. I am the foundation director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions and I am delighted to be here welcoming you today to what I hope will be a very special event.

We are very excited about hosting Mr Mikhail Gorbachev today, and I know from the responses that we have received that that excitement is widely shared. By having Mr Gorbachev here we are able to listen to a towering figure of twentieth century history. He shares the platform with two individuals who are very important to the work of my Centre. Professor Deane Terrell as Vice Chancellor of the Australian National University has given the Centre all the support we could ask for. We have found tremendous intellectual energy and enthusiasm from the ANU, and we feed off that in our work. We also gained support from the Asian Research Centre of Murdoch University in the west, which is our partner body.

Also sitting on the stage is the Honourable Alexander Downer, the Foreign Minister, and of course it is the Minister's vision that led to the formation of CDI. We in the Centre are trying to translate that vision into reality.

The Centre is funded by AusAID to assist developing countries with their good governance needs. But it is our view that we cannot achieve that job unless we establish a two-way flow of information, and that's why we are determined to bring to Australia and have speak at the Parliament individuals that can help us to understand the world's needs in this field.

The order of proceedings today will be that I will invite Professor Terrell to give some welcoming comments and then the Foreign Minister to introduce the keynote speaker. Mr Gorbachev will speak in Russian with consecutive translation by Mr Avel Palachenko[?]. He has then graciously agreed to answer questions for a few minutes. At around 1.30 we will adjourn for lunch at the back of the Mural Hall.

So may I call on first Professor Terrell and then Mr Downer. [Applause]

DEANE TERRELL: Mr Mikhail Gorbachev; the Honourable Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs; your excellencies; distinguished guests; ladies and gentlemen: on behalf of the Australian National University it is for me a very great pleasure indeed to welcome you to this Centre for Democratic Institutions address.

The Centre for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National University is an initiative of the Australian government. It is one in which the Minister, the Honourable Alexander Downer, has played a vital personal and developmental role in this particular Centre. And the University is very pleased indeed to give its full support to what is an extremely important initiative.

You will all be aware that ANU has a long tradition of involvement in Asia and the Pacific, and in that area it has played a unique role in the economics, politics and sociology of the region. We now seek to extend that involvement in economics, politics and sociology to all parts of the world and to link particularly with that emphasis in Asia.

The address today is to be delivered by a statesman who has profoundly affected the shape of global politics in our century and into the next century, and its delivery in this venue is to my mind symbolic of what the Centre for Democratic Institutions offers. It brings a great statesman into linkages with the Australian National University and the institutions of government here in Canberra and adds another dimension to our already strong relationship with countries of our region

The Centre for Democratic Institutions is contributing positively to the debate on democracy and governance by bringing speakers of such stature to us. Last year we had the former president of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, who spoke about the democratic evolution in his country. The CDI has also been active in a program of training at a crucial time for our neighbours in Indonesia. Now Mr Gorbachev comes to us as a key participant in the transition to democracy in Russia and as a distinguished commentator on that process.

The ANU is proud of its part in the contribution to research and training in the economics and politics of our region, and its interaction in particular with many other regions. We are proud of the contribution made by the University's Centre for Democratic Institutions, particularly so in that respect. I am very pleased indeed to say that we enjoy such substantial support from the Federal Government in these endeavours. The success of those endeavours is measured by the distinction of those who have chosen to participate in the CDI's program. We can have no better measure of that distinction than in today's speaker, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev. May I offer him a particular welcome to the ANU and to this CDI address, and may I also welcome all of you as our distinguished guests. [Applause]

ALEXANDER DOWNER: Well Mr Gorbachev; Vice-Chancellor Deane Terrell; Roland Rich, the director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions; my parliamentary colleagues; and ladies and gentlemen: Mikhail Sergeovich Gorbachev occupies a special place in the history of the twentieth century. His role during the 1980s in dismantling the Cold War structures which dominated international affairs for four decades can't be understated. Well known for his initiatives in the field of nuclear disarmament, he was also responsible for transforming Soviet relations with the West more broadly, enabling real dialogue to replace the arms race and Cold War rhetoric. As General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and then as President of the Soviet Union from 1990 to 1991, Mr Gorbachev presided over massive political change which had long-lasting global ramifications. His policies of glasnost and perestroika set in train democratic forces which would politically and economically transform the countries of the former Soviet Union and east Europe, and that was a remarkable achievement.

Mr Gorbachev's initiatives within the Soviet Union also enabled then communist countries to have a more open outlook towards the rest of the world. We're fortunate in Australia now to have strong people-to-people and cultural contacts with the peoples of the former communist bloc, as well as growing trade and investment ties.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Mr Gorbachev has continued to work in the fields of economic liberalisation and democratic reform. His Gorbachev Foundation in Russia, like the Centre for Democratic Institutions here, is active in promoting and researching democratisation processes. In recognition of his efforts towards world peace, in 1990 Mr Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But Mr Gorbachev's greatest achievement and his legacy to us all must surely be a world no longer dominated by ideological conflicts and the ultimate futility of the Cold War.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr Gorbachev:

[Applause]

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: (Translated) Since this is my final lecture, maybe I could ask my interpreter to give the lecture, because over these days he knows what I have been saying.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I thank you for this opportunity to speak to you.

I have been told who is present here, so I understand that you are well prepared and well informed, and this allows me to go straight to the point without any additional explanations.

I would like to preface my remarks by saying that since this is my last day in Australia and since I am spending this day in the capital of Australia, I would like to say that we have liked very much what we have seen here in this country. I had meetings and lectures, speaking to large groups of people in the biggest cities of Australia and my impressions have been very favourable, and I was particularly impressed by the fact that the people who came to hear me, to hear other lecturers in that lecture tour, that they came totally voluntarily and paid to listen to those lectures, and they represented in a way a cross section of Australia.

And from my discussions here, I conclude that the intellectual thought in Australia is very much alive, and I have been very much impressed by this. Yesterday I said that we have liked everything in Australia, including Australian cuisine. What I liked less was the cuisine that is served by Mr Murdoch–by the media of Mr Murdoch, even though I know Mr Murdoch and I met with him a few years ago. But of course this is for you to sort out. It is your country and it's up to you.

Speaking about Russia's road to democracy, of course, this is a very difficult road because it is a road from totalitarianism to democracy, and of course in Russia, whatever question, whatever issue you speak about, you always have to look at it in the context of history, and therefore the analysis of only what has happened since 1985 would not be sufficient because it would not give you an idea of the reasons of the profound causes and mechanisms behind what has been happening in our country.

We have to look at these things in the perspectives of the history since 1917 since the Bolshevik revolution, and even the history of the more ancient times, because what has been happening in our country since 1985 has been profoundly affected by our country's age-old history. The Russian State is 1,000 years old, and those 1,000 years have made an imprint on the country and on the national character of our people. Russia has existed for centuries at the crossroads of different religions, of different cultures, and this is a unique feature of the Russian civilisation, and this has been affecting–this crossroads situations has been affecting what has been happening in our country.

Russia is a vast country, and that vastness even of itself has made the country more difficult to govern–has made governance of Russia very difficult. That is why the State has always played a very important role in Russia, and that is why we have had a very high degree of rigid centralisation from the very beginning of the existence of the Russian empire. In Russia you have practically all of the religions represented. In Russia, until the break-up of the Soviet Union, we had 225 languages and dialects, and all of that had to be united in a single community and the State–again, the State played a very important role in that–the key role in that–and of course it played that role in various forms.

And finally, Russia has always faced the problem of protecting itself from outside danger–from outside threats–and the state played a very important role, a key role, in that aspect too.

Another important aspect–unique aspect–is that Russia has always had to catch up with the more advanced countries. This happened because whereas Russia, during the initial years and centuries of its development, was itself a rather advanced country, but then for about three centuries it was under Mongol domination. The Slavic nucleus of the population of Russia that played an integrating role in the Russian State and the Russian empire also played a civilising role vis a vis the more backward hinterlands, outlying regions of Russia, and that too required tremendous resources and slowed down the overall development of the economy and of the Russian society. And a very important conclusion should be drawn from this aspect, given the subject of my remarks.

In order to solve the problem of catching up with more advanced countries, Russia's rulers, beginning with Peter the Great and all the way to Nikita Kruschev and those who succeeded him, those whom you know, very often–always–practically always had to resort to the so-called ‘mobilisation model of development’, and the mobilisation model of development pre-determined the balance between centralism and democracy, a balance between autocratic and democratic ways of governing the country. And since democracy had very little role to play–had very little room in that mobilisation model of development, giving people a chance to operate in a democratic context–to operate in a free and democratic context does not mean that you will immediately get free people; that those people will immediately act and behave like free individuals. This takes time. This takes evolution. This cannot happen overnight. And we are speaking of a country–Russia–where serfdom, a form of slavery, existed almost until the end of the nineteenth century. That is to say, serfdom was abolished only in 1862, and the process of ending–actually ending serfdom was a long and difficult process.

Of course there were some democratic institutions, or rudimentary, quasi-democratic institutions in Russia from the very beginning of the existence of the Russian state–for example, the Veche in Nograd, an institution that had some aspects of parliamentary democracy and that existed many centuries ago. But, of course, that was all overlaid by many centuries of the existence of Tsarism and serfdom, and it was only toward the end of the existence of the Romanov dynasty that a parliament, the state Duma, was formed in Russia.

So that history has affected very considerably the processes that have been underway in Russia during the twentieth century. Monarchy was abolished in February 1917, and the first democratic government, the interim government, was created at that time. That was the beginning of Russia’s modern history. But the bourgeois democratic revolution failed because the government that was–that succeeded the Tsarist government in February 1917 was a weak government, a government that failed to keep the country together, a government that put the country on the verge of disintegration, and it was that failure that enabled the Bolsheviks to gain significant public support and to seize power.

The Bolsheviks had some attractive slogans that are of interest, even today: ‘an end to war’, ‘peace to all nations’, ‘freedom to all the oppressed’, ‘factories to the workers’ and ‘land to the peasants’. Those are wonderful slogans.

I will speak about what happened afterwards, but first let me say something about what the Bolsheviks thought about democracy. Lenin expressed the Bolsheviks’ view of democracy. He expressed it in the following way: ‘The proletariat should seize control of the country in the context of democracy and then should rule the country through democracy.’

Well theoretically that sounds quite correct. Well, of course, even later and under Stalin there was a lot of rhetoric that sounded good and attractive, but the political reality was quite different. Lenin’s government initially adopted the program for the rural areas that was similar, very similar to the program of their coalition partners, the Esshars[?], but then they expelled Esshars from their coalition government. Then they dismissed the constituent assembly–dissolved the constituent assembly that was freely elected by the people after the revolution. Then they banned opposition newspapers, and instead of democracy, they began to work on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Eventually Lenin understood that he had made a mistake. But then when he died Stalin took over, and he evolved the country into a very undemocratic, totalitarian direction. He created the totalitarian system that was then established in the country for decades. But again, if you read the so-called Stalin Constitution, it says that power belongs to the people. In fact, however, power was usurped in 1917, and only one political party was allowed–the Community Party. The other parties were either banned or abolished.

Again, the Soviet Constitution said that the Soviet people were free human beings, but that was in fact precluded because they could not take the initiative, particularly the economic initiative, because of the existence of just one form of property–state property. All the other forms of property, private forms of property and even co-operative forms of property even in the collective farms, the actual form of property was not collective but everything belonged to the state.

Similarly, the Constitution said that elections were free and by secret ballot. But people had no choice because in the ballot there was only one name–the name of the person who was decided by the Party. We had the cabinet of ministers and the Supreme Soviet–a kind of parliament–and they took decisions, but they took only those decisions that were first considered and adopted by the Party Politburo. The same system existed at the regional levels when I worked in one of the regions for several years as First Secretary of the Party, which would be the equivalent of the government. For seven years, before becoming the General Secretary of the Central Committee, I was a member of the Politburo, and I know very well from my own experience that no decision in the country–no important decision in the country was taken without first consideration and adoption by the Politburo.

I am still being asked: ‘What happened to the so-called Communist Party gold–the gold reserve that allegedly the Communist Party had?’ And my answer has always been that there was no gold reserve of the Communist Party. There was the gold reserve of the State, and every kilo of that gold reserve was allocated in accordance with the decisions of the Party Politburo. That’s how it was.

Let me give you another example, and that is that that was a country where there was supposed to be total uniformity of thought. There was no pluralistic discussion. The only pluralistic discussions allowed were in the people’s kitchens, and any kind of critical remarks about the Soviet system was regarded as anti-State and the people who made those remarks were jailed or exiled.

The Communist propaganda for many years was able to persuade people that there would be a happy future, that very soon some time in the future they will have–the people will have prosperity. But as people became better educated, more and more of them were wondering–were asking this question: ‘Why is it that there are other countries which have less resources and less potential wealth, but people there live better than we do in our own country?’

It is of course true that a lot was accomplished under the old system for building culture and civilisation in our country, but for that standard of education, culture, et cetera, people paid a very heavy price, particularly the price of their own freedom. They sacrificed their own freedom. So when the technological–particularly when the technological revolution started throughout the world, other countries–more advanced countries–were able to adjust to that revolution. A lot of structural change happened in those countries, and they coped with the challenges of the technological revolution, whereas our country–the country where people lacked freedom, where the system was based on that lack of freedom–was not able to adjust to those economic and technological challenges, and the gap between us and the advanced countries grew; and that’s why perestroika was necessary.

Initially we thought–including I thought–that we could improve our system, breathe new life into our system by injecting some democracy into it, and glasnost and freedom of speech were important in and of themselves. They certainly helped us to move along the path of reform. But quite soon I and my associates agreed and concluded that the system, the old system under which we worked had to be replaced, had to be changed altogether because it could not be improved, it could not be reformed, and therefore the declaration of political and economic freedom and human rights had to be complemented by genuine political reform, genuine political reform that would allow those freedoms to take root.

In the first free elections that were held in 1989, most of the party bureaucrats–a significant portion of party bureaucracy was defeated. That shocked the Politburo and that shocked the entire Communist Party nomenclature, and that is when the battle began between the reformers within our Party and the anti-reform forces that were concentrated in the Right wing reactionary wing of the Party, and particularly in the nomenclature in the government and the economic bureaucracy. The political nomenclature and the economic bureaucracy actually wielded power, and they had vested interests in the system, and therefore their defeat in the free elections was a blow to those vested interests; and despite their resistance, we were able to create, for the first time in [inaudible] a free parliament that was not dependent on the Politburo. In that parliament, for the first time, the members of the Politburo were seated in the audience with all the other deputies–with all the other members, rather than at the podium. For you, that’s normal and routine. For us, that was a dramatic development. And since all of that happened on live TV, because both the meetings of the supreme soviet and the first Congress of People’s Deputies were broadcast live, our people–our country saw what was happening, and they welcomed what was happening. For the first time, the government was formed on the basis of the decisions of the parliament rather than of the Politburo.

A separation of powers happened, and that was extremely important. The same thing later happened in the constituent republics of the Soviet Union and in the regions. We also prepared ground for judicial reform and power in the courts, and that was important because until then we had what was called the telephone law rather than the courts deciding.

Perestroika however was interrupted and undermined because of the activities of two forces, and that is the separatists, and also because of the economic discontent of the people. Nevertheless, perestroika was successful in ending the situation of a total lack of freedom. We had free elections. We had political pluralism. We built a legislative basis for various forms of property. We built a legislative and legal basis for the creation and functioning of different political parties and groups. And during the final months of perestroika, we adopted a law on freedom of expression, freedom of the press, that I believe was the most democratic one in the world at that time. And even after the break-up of the Soviet Union, all of these things have been preserved in a certain way, and they are still influencing the processes underway in Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union. But the functioning of democratic institutions has been undermined and complicated by the attempt to reform the economy overnight using methods of the so-called shock therapy. That kind of shock therapy approach resulted in a significant deterioration of the economy and in a great decline in the standard of living of the people, and this policy–this policy of shock therapy, which I can describe as a new kind of Bolshevism–as a neo-Bolshevism–this kind of policy was pursued and imposed on the country by the administration of the president–by the presidential administration, and the presidential administration was able to defeat parliament in the political battle.

That same parliament that gave President Yeltsin extraordinary rights and powers–extraordinary powers in implementing reforms and in ruling the country–that same parliament was, in October 1993, dismissed, dissolved and shelled by tanks.

In 1994 a new constitution was adopted, a constitution that reallocated powers in favour of the presidency. The presidency concentrated virtually all the powers of the government, whereas the parliament was devalued, depreciated, and the government–the cabinet of ministers became virtually powerless.

The situation became really absurd. At this time opinion polls indicate that 98 per cent of the people of Russia polled in those surveys did not support the President. About 80 per cent of the people agreed that he should take early retirement; but he remains the constitutional leader of Russia. In the meantime, the parliament has so little power. The powers of the parliament make it virtually impotent.

The governments are replaced at the whim of the president, and they come and go, one after another, becoming scapegoats. This is how the Primikov government was dismissed; the same government that saved the country from sliding into chaos after the financial crash of last August.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much Mr Gorbachev.

We will have some 15 minutes or so for questions, and may I, as the chairman, take the opportunity to ask the first question:

Mr Gorbachev, we have seen in a number–

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: The rule is not quite democratic to our opposing your prerogative–your privilege!

CHAIRMAN: Today I’m a member of the nomenclature.

We have seen in a number of former communist countries the former communist parties come back to power. In Russia, should that occur, in your opinion is the Russian communist party committed to political pluralism?

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: Certainly the democratic process in the former Soviet Union and in the countries of central and eastern Europe has resulted in great change really across the board–really fundamental change, and there are many new parties, and many of the former communists and so-called workers parties have evolved and have changed very fundamentally. It was a real process of renewal. Both the programs and the people in those parties have changed–and they have changed their attitude toward democracy, and it is that that enabled many of those former communist parties to again be elected and to get the support of the people and the [inaudible].

We were planning to have the final congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in November of 1991, and we were planning a demarcation during that congress between the different tendencies within the party–basically a division of the party, but the coup in August made it impossible to have that congress. Well, the present Communist Party of the Russian Federation includes many of those [inaudible] plotters.

Of course today the Communist Party is in opposition to the ruling regime, and many people agree with its criticism of the ruling regime. However, the program of the Communist Party and the nature of that Communist Party is distrusted by many people–I would say by most people–in Russia. And the analysis of most political scientists and commentators and my own analysis indicates that if the present-day Communist Party of the Russian Federation continues as before, it will not be able to gain support and to become the governing party–the ruling party, and this is even more so since right now there is a process of the formation of other non-communist political parties and alliances underway. One of them is being led by the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Liskov[?]; the other a left-wing alliance is being formed by various left-wing groups who disagree with the policies–with the policy line of the Communist Party, and those dissidents include the member of the Communist Party and speaker of the Parliament, Genady Sirisnov[?]. And I believe that democratically or constitutionally the communists and their present shape and form–the Communist Party of the Russian Federation–will not be able even to get a clear majority in parliament or to win the presidency. And since that is not a prospect to be considered, then I think that the second part of your question becomes inoperative.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

I think we had a question over here on the left. Please introduce yourself.

CHRISTOPHER PYNE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Christopher Pyne.

Mr President, the attitude of the Russian government to the situation in Kosovo is of great interest to the West. Would you like to comment on the situation there; and also the attitude of the Russian government towards future negotiations in that region?

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: Well, in all my lectures and press appearances I have commented extensively on this.

Very briefly, my own view–my own position on this conflict is the following:

It is a real conflict. It resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia. When President Milosovic was fearful that Kosovo too might break away from what remained of Yugoslavia, he decided 10 years ago to take away the status of autonomy that Kosovo had enjoyed; and since that time, Milosovic has not done anything to prevent the further deterioration of the Kosovo problem, which of course today is extremely tragic and dramatic. But neither did the European community, or Russia–that enjoys much influence in that region–did nearly enough in order to prevent the deterioration of that situation–of that conflict. Nor did the Security Council of the United Nations do enough to seriously consider the situation and develop a program for its resolution. And in that situation, the Albanians started to put together a movement called the Kosovo Liberation Army. They armed that army, and the army began its own operations. That brought about a response from the government of Yugoslavia–from Milosovic. The police and military forces responded to the Kosovo Liberation Army. It was only then that others began to come alive. It was only then that others began to respond to the situation. But I agree with most serious analysts and commentators who believe that the military action–the air strikes started by NATO were not necessary, because other ways–other means had not yet been exhausted to effect the situation–to try to change the situation for the better.

As a result of the air strikes, the conflict became even more tragic, and the conflict has deteriorated into a real catastrophe. Hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes. But I must say that the Serbs too have suffered tremendously as a result of the air strikes and bombings.

There are dozens of similar conflicts in the world, but the question is: ‘Why did NATO decide to act the way it did–the way it is doing in this particular conflict? Why did it act with ultimatums? Why did it act with air strikes. Why did it act with all its military power rather than using other methods?’

Today, people like Jimmy Carter, Henry Kissinger, political scientists, Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology–from Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other institutions have agreed and have said to the administration–to the US administration–that it had acted rationally[sic], that it had acted thoughtlessly and that the use of military power has been unwarranted and irresponsible.

I believe that Kosovo really revealed a process that started four or five years ago, and I have been speaking out about that since that time.

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of a proper partner for the United States, the United States began to change the strategy–to change the strategy that enabled us to put an end to the Cold War. They abandoned the strategy that enabled us to put an end to confrontation and to start the process of arms control and to move toward a new world order.

The central aspect of the strategy that has now been abandoned by the United States of the strategy that enabled us to end the Cold War was that we should enhance the role of the United Nations, that there should be equal cooperation both through the United Nations–a reformed United Nations–and various regional security and cooperation organisations. But in the past four or five years the United States has done a great deal in order to disparage and in fact discredit the United Nations–the UN Security Council–to discredit and humiliate its Secretary-General–former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali; also to disparage and discredit the European institution; and of course also to humiliate Russia and to cut Russia off from any role in resolving international conflicts. That is because they had a different definition. The United States now has a different definition of a new world order. Within that definition, they are treating even their European allies as their subordinates. One example: the Europeans wanted world leaders–the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, a major political leader, to become the Secretary-General of NATO. The Americans rejected that, and instead they selected Javier Solana, who has been acting as their puppet. So, having discredited all of those international organisations, the Yugoslavia conflict is being used in order to show that the only real force in the world today is NATO–the United States and NATO. I believe this is a great mistake and a grave illusion. I believe that this strategy has already failed–it has failed morally, it has failed politically, and that’s why there is such a great deal of criticism of the administration and of the president, even in the United States.

Eighty-one per cent of the Russian people polled in opinion surveys disagree with the decision to dismiss the Primikov cabinet. Only 8 per cent supported the firing of Prime Minister Primikov.

Of course lawyers among you may remind me of the fact that while the constitution exists and that we should live according to the existing constitution, as the Romans said ‘let the world be destroyed’, but law should still prevail, or one has to change laws. So this is the situation–this is the situation that we are facing. The president is a spent force, politically, physically, intellectually. He still rules, despite the fact that he doesn’t have any support to speak of; whereas the person in the cabinet that had the people’s support, that had a lot of popularity and trust of the people–that cabinet and that prime minister were fired.

So, this is the state of Russian democracy today; and that represents backsliding, compared to what was achieved to what was accomplished during the years of perestroika. But nevertheless something very important can take place, and that is: parliamentary elections later this year, and then next year presidential elections. Perhaps we could have presidential elections even before the middle of next year if necessary.

It is very important for us, for the first time in Russian history, to have a change of government–a change of Russia’s rulers–in a democratic and constitutional way.

I am hopeful, because I believe we have drawn lesson; we have drawn proper conclusions from what happened both during the years of perestroika and during the post-perestroika period of the existence of the Russian state.

You may have seen that very often the protesters in the streets of Russia carry the portraits of Josef Stalin. Well, we probably have a Stalin–a Stalin of a different kind. But even that person has not resorted to massive repression, to massive atrocities–and that’s very important.

I would accept and even prefer that the President serve out his entire presidential term, and step down within the constitutional format–within the constitutional process. I would even favour the adoption of a law that would provide certain guarantees for him in the future. I would do all that for the sake of the continuation of the democratic process and democratic institutions in Russia.

There is only one kind of dictatorship that our country needs, and that is the dictatorship of law–the dictatorship of the laws. All other kinds of dictatorship we had too much of in the centuries of Russia’s history. But I remain optimistic.

Thank you for your attention. So maybe I have spoken five or 10 minutes longer than I was allocated, but of course the fault is not with the president but with the interpreter!

Thank you. [Applause]

Professor Samual Huntington of Harvard has said–and I agree–that the United States, having remained alone as the single remaining superpower, has been acting irresponsibly.

I also agree with former president Jimmy Carter, who wrote in his recent article that the United States is relying exclusively on its military power, and has ignored the time-tested methods of dialogue and negotiation in international affairs.

So, what should be done now?

There are quite a few proposals, but let us understand, there will be no winners in this conflict. There has to be a compromise.

I just talked with your Opposition Leader, the former Defence Minister, and we recalled the old times, and he told me that when he visited the United States, he heard from many people the criticism of President Regan. They were saying that President Regan had made too many concessions to Gorbachev. Well, I told him I was similarly criticised in my country. They said that I had made too many concessions to the United States; what was necessary was compromise. And we struck that compromise. The only way to achieve a solution of any problem is through compromise.

A group of Nobel Peace Prize winners meeting in Rome last month made proposals about how this crisis could be resolved. Russia has made proposals about how this crisis could be resolved. It would seem that now President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany also have some proposals to make. But those who demand surrender–just capitulation of one side–will fail.

The Serbs did not surrender to the Nazis, and they will now not surrender to the air strikes that are destroying their country for no reason at all.

I am calling for at least a pause in air strikes, and during that pause I believe some kind of a political dialogue–a negotiating process–should be started, and I believe there is a chance that this process would lead to a solution. And also after that–after the conflict–I believe, and I have called for a special extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the overall situation of the world, and to discuss how we could move to a genuine new world order based on the United Nations.

Well, the question that was asked has prompted me to give a lecture here. It’s that kind of question. It took me all the time. Again, I am not to blame. It’s the young man who asked the question! [Applause]

CHAIRMAN: Your program runs with military precision, so we must call a halt at this stage.

It remains for me to offer my thanks. You have shared with us the wisdom of a great statesman, and the insights of somebody who has shaped the world as we know it.

I can only offer my most humble speciva[?].

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: Thank you very much. [Applause]