New Truths and Political Realities

12 May 1992

Mr. Chairman!

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I accepted with interest your proposal to speak here to specialists in international relations.

In my governmental activities I have more than once had the opportunity to appreciate that political decisions lacking a basis in science may lead nowhere -- especially in a period of transition, when one is continually facing decisions, continually seeking the optimal choice.

What is more, in the science of international relations things today are difficult. New realities demand new approaches and new conclusions, sometimes even the scrapping of whole concepts.

Old approaches and old illusions must be overcome. Scholars and political figures today have a common concern -- not to fall behind in the headlong rush of time.

Much we have already abandoned. Let us recall that there was once a discipline called sovietology which serviced the policies of the "Cold War." It studied us from a position of dislike, even hostility, and, as a rule, with predetermined results. It helped fashion the image of the "Evil Empire."

I wonder how often your research led to the conclusion that such a profound turnaround was possible in the Soviet Union. How many people really grasped the presence of forces for renewal, even at the highest levels of government.

Our Americanists did just as much damage, servicing the totalitarian regime and the policies of confrontation, feeding self-satisfaction and boastfulness.

Of course, even then there were genuine scholars both in America and in Russia. Much of what they wrote has withstood the test of time. But the public atmosphere in those years, and the rules of the game, did not favor the unprejudiced and far-reaching analysis of events.

Today many of our sholars in the social sciences, including international relations, are embarrassed, since what they wrote in the past seems no longer relevant.

What is more, the burden of earlier works and conclusions weighs heavily on their capacity to see things differently. In your country, very probably, something similar is occurring.

The most difficult aspect of the coordinated understanding of our relationship (which we all desire) is obviously to combine views which have really been modified in principle with what we have inherited, making use of the positive achievements of the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s.

In this matter, investigators on both sides are no longer opponents facing each other across ideological barricades, but are partners in the difficult matter of grasping a new reality. And this reality knows no analogies in world history and does not fit any existing patterns.

Just what is this object of cognition-- Russia -- in the new system of international coordinates? The crisis of the state and society continues and will be rather extended.

And all along it is going to be dangerous for democracy -- until such time as the population starts to feel the material benefits of reform. Therefore I sincerely and decisively support the economic reforms of the present government headed by B.I. Yeltsin.

During the first months of this year the government was too attracted by the financial aspects of stabilization, seen as an exercise in macroeconomic rationality.

However, the fate of the reform depends upon an optimum balance of its economic and social aspects. This is especially true in our country, with the psychology which has crystallized there during the decades of a command-paternalistic system.

The success of the reforms, and thus the future of our democracy, also depend upon understanding and support by foreign democracies. I agree with President Bush's description of this support as the major foreign-policy task of the United States.

The Foundation which I head is going to deal with the problem of the emergence of a new Russian state, including its connections with world processes and international politics. If that theme is of interest to your Council, we would be happy to cooperate with you.

There is a whole set of issues affecting the relations between the United States and Russia.

An evaluation of the international role and place of the Russian Federation is difficult in view of the fact that it is just taking to the seas as an independent state. The "childhood diseases" of Russian foreign policy and diplomacy are visible to the naked eye: a seeming overconfidence and scorn for everything done before; a fondness for external effect and fleeting contacts; failure to think through many of its proposals and actions; failure to coordinate the positions of those at the center of power.

These are all transient phenomena, however, and should not create any real difficulties for the substance of relations with Russia. But you, in turn, should not adopt a maximalist position.

Russia is in a new geopolitical situation, surrounded, in particular, by new states which are former republics of the USSR. We now call them the "nearby" foreign countries. Often it is harder to deal with them than with our former foreign partners.

We know that problems of Russian-American relations are under active discussion in the United States both by scholars and by politicians. To the extent that we can judge, there are two fundamental approaches.

The first is oriented to extracting benefit from the present position of the Russian Federation, preventing it from benefiting to the maximum from its status as successor-state to the Soviet Union.

The second approach, which is the one supported by both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker, especially judging by their statements of April 21 and 22 -- and we hope this approach will prevail -- assumes that a powerful, renovated, democratic Russia is in the national interests of the United States.

Here scholarship has a broad field of activity. This field must be properly cultivated so that it will yield the necessary harvest.

The term, partnership, has become customary in both politics and science. But what is this supposed to mean in practice? A reduction in the level of military confrontation? Yes, without a doubt. But is this alone sufficient to achieve a new quality in our relationship?

As I see it, there are two sets of problems.

First I would like to direct attention to the need for a radical shift in military and strategic thinking.

For, despite reservations, we still approach one another, at least in military circles, as potential enemies. This is more evident in the United States than in Russia.

I do not want to play down the significance of the attempts already undertaken on both sides to elaborate a new defense doctrine. But it may be that the real task is one of together formulating a doctrine ensuring our mutual security, including military affairs and intelligence. Scholarship could also make its contribution here.

It is, furthermore, extremely important to stimulate contacts and exchanges at the citizen level. The experience of Western Europe, especially Franco-German experience starting in the 1950s, confirms that there is no more effective way of overcoming mutual alienation and mistrust.

Something is being done in this direction, but I have more in mind: the elaboration and implementation of special programs at a high policy level. For this purpose it might be advisable to establish a Russian-American Committee or something similar.

As for the second set of problems, the search for new and constructive ideas, this would sharpen attention to the theme of a stable world order.

First of all we need a coordinated policy vis-a-vis the United Nations. It is generally recognized that a lessening of the Soviet-American confrontation has had a beneficial impact on its activities, and this alone should inspire confidence that the effectiveness of the United Nations and its organs will be heightened if this impulse in Russian-American relations is maintained and developed. In Fulton I have already spoken about the need for timely reforms in its structures.

But it would surely be an error to assume that everything is quite clear in the matter of United Nations reform. Here, again, could not the efforts of scholarly researchers be brought together?

Understandably, both our countries have their regional interests. And these must be borne in mind if we are to continue to improve the relations between Russia and the U.S., noting where they coincide, where they are parallel, and where further effort will be needed to bring them into some sort of balance.

Hence the necessity of studying and evaluating these interests in an unprejudiced way. Here scholarship should precede policy.

For a start let us look at Europe. Will a renovated Russia want the U.S. to have a role in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation? As you know, opinions on this in our country are divided.

My own view is definite. I feel that it is in the interests of Russia that the United States here not make any concessions to "isolationism." On this I agree with James Baker's position.

For Russia it is vitally important to participate organically and actively in the Helsinki process, in its development under new conditions. And, naturally enough, it will oppose efforts to erect any sort of "cordon sanitaire" on its Western borders.

I think that such a turn of events would not benefit the United States either. This problem demands some thinking through and coordination of positions, in order to ward off misunderstandings before they occur.

Let us look to the south of Russia. Like the United States, it has inherited responsibiity under international law for a Middle Eastern settlement. Russia is a cochairman of the Conference on a Middle Eastern settlement.

But there are not enough new ideas here; the process is slowing down, and there is some danger of losing what has already been achieved. Some in our country, overcome by pessimism, are urging Russia's withdrawal from the Middle East altogether.

I do not agree with this view. Quite to the contrary, new opportunities are now opening up for an active Russian presence, which would be useful for all, especially since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

I hardly think that the United States wants to weaken the Russian position in this region, since that would just make its own position there more difficult. In general, this theme also offers much material for research and development.

Russia is a Eurasian state. Geography and history have so ordained. It it would be pointless not to take this into account. Fate itself has determined that a radically reformed Russia should retain its role of link with the East, and especially with the moslem world. Moslems constitute a majority in 6 of the 15 former union republics, and they are broadly represented in Russia itself.

In recent years important preconditions for a Russian policy in Asia have been created thanks to a substantial improvement of its relations with such great powers as China and India.

It would be a major miscalculation not to seize the opportunities opening up here. But this does not mean that there are no problems here demanding new approaches and new research into future trends.

Asia in the past, especially the Asian-Pacific region, was a battle-field between U.S. and Soviet interests. Today the confrontation in this part of the world has been substantially reduced.

But the question must still be answered whether or not the interests of the U.S. and Russia here are still in collision. If the answer is "yes," what is the nature of the collision? If "no," what conclusions should be drawn?

In the Far East Russia must assert itself as a Pacific state. In the new post-confrontation geopolitical pattern, Russian and American interests in the Asian-Pacific region coincide rather than contradict one another.

Russian-American cooperation can become a major guarantee that the northern part of the Pacific basin will become a meeting place, a place for dialogue and synthesis of European and Asian values.

Many people in our country take it as indisputable that Russia will not have a global policy in the old sense of the word, meaning a policy based on the assumption of a Russian presence everywhere on the surface of the earth.

But it is no less obvious that it will continue to have a policy vis-a-vis regions which are distant from it, such as: Latin America, the African continent, southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand. This assumes that Russia will remain a naval state although, of course, in a different interpretation of that concept than before.

How this will be linked to American interests in these regions is a question we should try to answer together.

In connection with the efforts of both countries to stabilize the world order, the problem of human rights cannot be ignored. Quite recently they had opposite positions on this matter. But between today's Russia and the United States there are no differences of principle.

This also opens up new opportunities for combined action, opportunities which, perhaps, have not yet been adequately appreciated.

And there is one more thing. In an increasingly interdependent world there is an increasing need for international projects in such fields as health protection, education, ecology, and power production. Of course, for the time being our material capacities will not be comparable to yours.

But Russia has a tremendous scientific potential, major scientific and technical accomplishments. In the number of inventions -- which, indeed, remain on the shelf -- we are, as before, in the very first place among all the countries of the world. This could be our initial contribution to the solution of common problems of humanity.

Some comments about the problems of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Without claiming to make recommendations, I would still like to say something about pivotal directions of research for possible joint effort by scholars.

The transition from an authoritariian-totalitarian past to democratic forms of life cannot be done in the same way everywhere, for example, in Belorussia and in Central Asia. What is more, I assume that the forms and rates of movement will be different even in the case of such countries as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Therefore the core discipline of "CIS-ology," if I may be forgiven this term, could be a comparative analysis of the democratization processes in various regions of the former Soviet Union, ascertaining what is common and what is specific in the development of these young states.

Within the framework of these problems, attention should first be directed to studying ways of making the transition from an administrative-command to a market economy.

For the first time in human history this is being done on such a large sale, in such a brief period of time, and under conditions of collapse of a unitary state.

From my point of view the basic integrating reference point should be that everyone becomes a fully entitled property owner who is capable of it and wants to be one. This would also constitute the material basis for a "common market" and, consequently, preservation of the historically determined ties between these new states and Russia.

And as for the study of political processes in the new states, where the party-state has now been simultaneously replaced by fifteen political systems which are different but still resemble one another, is this not an attractive theme of research for scholars who are striving to make their contribution to the process of formation of a new civilization?

The third set of substantive issues is the spiritual regeneration of our peoples.

The collapse of the communist ideology has left a yawning emptiness in the mass consciousness. People have been deprived of their primary points of reference, and life has lost its ultimate meaning. At the same time, a return to the pre-Bolshevik past is impossible, although there is a certain appeal to tradition.

The basic and long-time dilemma of the Russian consciousness is the choice between integration into the world community or seeking a special path. The answer has always depended upon the West and does so today.

One must recall that Russia will not agree to a secondary role. It is "condemned" to be a great country but, in contrast to the past, not by setting itself against the surrounding world, but by becoming an organic part of it.

Thus now is the time to think, to analyze, to investigate. The strength of a true science is that it is sovereign and independent. And the more fully and actively this strength is utilized, the more valuable its policy recommendations.

Thank you for your patience.

Mikhail Gorbachev