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Facilitating Chemical Weapons Destruction
By Sergei Baranovsky, Stephan Robinson and Paul Walker
Green Cross Legacy Programme
In 1995 Green Cross organised a public meeting in Shchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region of Russia, to discuss plans for the destruction of the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons stockpile. Several hundred local residents packed the small town hall, and many more stood outside in the square. Tensions were obviously running very high in the community. The Shchuch’ye facility, one of the seven major chemical weapons arsenals in Russia, had been chosen by Russia and the United States as the site for US support through its Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme.
As the two dozen American visitors and speakers, including US government representatives and contractors, filed through the crowd into the hall, shouts could be heard: Why are you bringing American chemical weapons here? Why are you experimenting on us with unproven technologies? Why are you smuggling nuclear weapons here to destroy them? Other opponents of the planned CW destruction facility held up signs boldly proclaiming "No development — no demilitarisation!", highlighting their objection to the planned CW destruction facility unless significant investments were first made to improve the infrastructure in this extremely poor region.
The events in Shchuch’ye illustrate the strong and, at times, uninformed local and regional concerns and heightened mistrust that have accompanied the weapons destruction programmes in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere. Such local protests represent formidable challenges for successful programme implementation, and demonstrate the need for full stakeholder involvement in decision making at all levels.
Green Cross
Green Cross International (GCI) was founded in 1993 by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and other prominent leaders from the United States, Russia, Japan, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Since then, it has expanded more than fivefold, with 26 national affiliates on five continents, and is now implementing a wide variety of programmes. Green Cross grew out of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit") in Rio de Janeiro, at which many participants voiced their concerns over the lack of an effective global advocate for the environment. GCI was therefore founded to help create, in broad terms, a sustainable future by cultivating harmonious relationships between people and the environment. A central point in GCI’s working philosophy is that cooperation with all stakeholders, not confrontation, is the most productive approach to resolving problems.
In 1994 GCI and its President Mikhail Gorbachev established the Environmental Legacy of Wars programme to facilitate the safe and environmentally sound destruction of Cold War weapons arsenals. As President Gorbachev pointed out, "These weapons present real threats to local, national, and international security; it’s high time we destroyed them in the safest and most appropriate ways". Over the last six years, three of GCI’s national affiliates — Global Green USA, Green Cross Russia, and Green Cross Switzerland — have combined efforts to facilitate consensus at the local, regional, national and global levels, in order to move forward with weapons demilitarisation programmes.
The Legacy programme is just one of GCI’s major efforts. Other programmes include:
The Legacy programme addresses issues such as the destruction of Cold War weapons, the environmental impacts of the wars in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkans, the long-term health consequences of the Vietnam War, and public health issues related to the Cold War in Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. Green Cross and its affiliates always undertake these efforts as third-party, neutral facilitators and mediators, an approach that affords them access to, and legitimacy among all stakeholders, including local, regional and national officials, citizens, academics and public interest groups.
In the field of chemical weapons, Legacy’s project "ChemTrust" ("Chemical weapons: Trust building for their destruction") aims to seek practical local solutions to the issue of destruction. Under this project, local outreach offices have been established at five of the seven Russian stockpile sites; seven public hearings and workshops have been organised at the local and regional levels; and information has been distributed through both electronic and print media. Citizens’ advisory boards have also been created to stimulate national dialogue and to encourage local participation in innovative technology development, and Russian—American exchanges and partnerships have been promoted. This work has been funded through public charitable contributions, foundation grants, and British, Swiss and US government contracts.
In the process of destroying chemical weapons, a number of fundamental challenges deserve specific mention here.
Deadlines versus reality
The Chemical Weapons Convention stipulates that all CW arsenals must be abolished not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention, by 2007, with a possibility for the Conference of the States Parties to grant an extension of up to five years, to 2012. This timeframe of maximum 10-15 years has placed noticeable pressure on the implementing agencies in both the United States and Russia. Over the last five years, funding constraints, delays in obtaining environmental permits, technological problems, and local political concerns have combined to make these legally binding deadlines appear unrealistic. For example, local officials have stated that if given the choice between meeting the Convention’s deadlines or waiting for greater safety and public health assurances, they would opt for the latter in order to protect their constituents. It could be that the time required for planning, obtaining permits, constructing and putting into operation a chemical weapons destruction facility in some cases would be as much as 12 years or more, so that all of the Russian and at least two US sites might not be able to meet the 2012 deadline. This "deadline versus reality" issue often leads to conflicting approaches and confrontations in programme implementation.
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Green Cross President Mikhail Gorbachev, on the occasion of the biannual Green Cross General Assembly in Geneva in June, 2000, signed three dozen letters to U.S., Russian and European leaders appealing for expanded support of Russian chemical weapons destruction and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. |
The funding gap
It is apparent that when chemical weapons were being produced decades ago in such large numbers and in such complicated ways, little thought was given to dismantling them. Today, it is estimated that it will cost $25 billion to destroy the total of 70,000 tonnes of munitions contained in the Russian and American CW arsenals, an amount that dwarfs the initial costs of production. The United States is committing more than $1 billion annually to its destruction programme, and has already destroyed almost 20% of its arsenal, but Russia finds itself unable to provide the finance needed to implement its destruction programme. The United States has therefore committed itself to helping Russia demilitarise as well, through the eight-year-old Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme. The United States has borne the largest part of the Russian chemical destruction burden to date, having spent some $150 million on planning and technology development for the Shchuch’ye site. Other States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) and the European Union have pledged a total of $50 million, although this is only 2—3% of the amount Russia will need to eliminate its CW stockpiles.
It is clear that the United States must continue its support, through the CTR programme, for Russian chemical weapons destruction; this is the "long pole" in the weapons destruction tent. If this "long pole" is removed, the tent may remain standing for a while, but it will collapse sooner or later. Other States Parties to the Convention must also increase their support if Russia is to have any chance of success in meeting the treaty’s deadlines.
Infrastructure needs
Most of the local communities that have been affected by these large chemical weapons arsenals are in need of considerable infrastructure development. This is particularly the case in Russia, where many towns and villages still lack the most basic necessities, such as adequate housing, central utilities, sewerage and potable water supply systems, schools, emergency and public health services, roads and bridges. In many cases it is impossible to construct and operate a destruction facility without first upgrading the infrastructure. One American community — Tooele, Utah — has even required the Army to provide local compensation in fees-per-tonne in order to destroy the stockpile. Russia, with Western support, must commit itself to providing an adequate infrastructure that will bring the communities living near destruction facilities into the 21st century. Such developments must also be well planned, perhaps through the international community, in order to prevent a "boom and bust" cycle, and to build a truly sustainable economy in these regions.
The technology gap
Not only is it expensive to destroy chemical weapons in secure, automated facilities, it is also very complicated, requiring extensive R&D to devise new technologies that are individually appropriate for each weapons type and stockpile site. The incineration process used in the United States, for example, has undergone thousands of engineering design changes since it was first installed over a decade ago. Recent leaks of nerve agent from the smokestack at Tooele, and ongoing difficulties in safely destroying dunnage (related non-agent waste such as wood and plastics), illustrate that further technology development is necessary. Most experts now recognise that there is no "silver bullet" to the problems involved in destroying chemical agents and munitions, and that a varied toolbox of complementary technologies, not all of which are yet fully developed, will be necessary to carry out the task of full and safe destruction.
Public involvement
In constructing very large CW destruction facilities and, ultimately, in abolishing an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, perhaps the most challenging aspect is to ensure that all stakeholders are involved in the decisions that will affect their lives. The extent of public involvement may vary from site to site, but a pro-active outreach effort — not just public relations — is needed, preferably by a neutral third party, to ensure that the demilitarisation process is properly and successfully implemented. For example, if an environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO) opposes the plans to build and operate a destruction facility, the ensuing legal proceedings will inevitably cause delays and lead to additional costs. If local or regional officials oppose a technology, laws can be passed to block implementation. If local public health or environmental officials are unconvinced, permits can be withheld or withdrawn. Therefore, the ongoing involvement of the public, including regulatory officials, in the planning, monitoring and execution of any demilitarisation programme is absolutely essential to ensure success in the long term. The American experience in recent years has clearly shown the benefits of public outreach for the quality of the entire process.
In Shchuch’ye, for example, the Legacy programme has helped facilitate public involvement for more than three years. Activities have included public hearings that are open to all stakeholders; pro-active outreach to the press, citizens and public officials; maintenance of local information offices; independent risk and health assessments; emergency preparedness training; public involvement training for Russian citizens in the US; and partnering between Shchuch’ye and US stockpile sites. We are also in process of establishing a Citizens’ Advisory Commission, which will help to oversee and advise the demilitarisation process. Although these efforts have not totally overcome local concerns and opposition, they have served to empower the community, to raise critical issues and, we believe, to improve the whole stockpile destruction programme.
Over the past five years of the Legacy programme, we have learned that NGOs can play an essential role in the implementation of programmes such as the historic elimination of chemical weapons, especially in view of their legitimacy among many stakeholder communities. We therefore urge Member States of the OPCW to include NGOs in organisational proceedings as well. Green Cross, under President Gorbachev’s leadership, is fully committed to helping facilitate the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, not only because of its goal to eliminate all such weapons, but also for the important and long-term precedent it sets for global disarmament and verification in general.
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Dr Paul F. Walker
Paul F. Walker is Director of the Legacy Program of Global Green USA, an effort focusing on military toxic waste cleanup and other legacies of the Cold War. He was formerly a Professional Staff Member of the Armed Services Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives where he served as a senior advisor to the Chairman and full committee. Dr Walker has lectured widely both in the USA and abroad and has published numerous books, articles, and op-eds on military and foreign policies as well as teaching at M.I.T., Harvard, and Tufts University.
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Sergei Baranovsky, Stephan Robinson and Paul Walker manage the Green Cross Legacy programmes in Russia, Switzerland and the United States, respectively.
Green Cross
International
Interview with Stephan Robinson
By Nadine McNeil
Q The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), like other disarmament
regimes, is an agreement between nation states, administered
by a dedicated Secretariat. What role can a non-governmental
organisation (NGO)’s like Green Cross International play
in this arrangement?
A When you look at any disarmament treatyies, it is obvious
that it is a long way from concluding it to implementing it.
Just because a your disarmament treaty is "‘morally
good"’ does not mean that you it will not run into
problems. At a given some time, the your treaty has to be materialised
implemented somewhere on the ground. Now The people who live
close to a planned chemical weapons destruction facility there
of course are afraid, of course, since words like "‘chemical"’
or "‘nuclear"’ sound always sound dangerous.
They do n’ot care whether the facility it is for the benefit
of a larger, or even global cause, but fear for their own health
and their environment. If you cannot communicate the contents
of the your destruction plans do not address and meet their concerns,
you the process will inevitably run into a dead end.
One problem now for the a government concerned is usually
that in this game it is usually also a stakeholder. It has developed
these chemical weapons, usually under a shroud lot of secrecy;
and sometimes the circumstances were rather questionable. This
is now where an NGO can be of benefit, by facilitating as a neutral
third party the consensus-building finding process between the
government and the the local communityies. I want to be very
clear — , NGOs cannot substitute for the state, since they
do not have neither the legal authorityempowerment nor the big
money that governments have, . but NGOs they are often very well
informed about most aspects of the issue and are more innovative
in the design of new solutions.
I have also have to say that our experience has shown ed us
that one key to success is to achieve communication between all
four levels involved in international disarmament projects, i.e.
the local communities, the regional administrations, the central
power, and the international community. Each of these levels
They all carries y a part of the responsibility, and it is important
you have an interest that they all remain involved constructively
involved. This is an aspect Green Cross on which we put places
a lot of emphasis on this aspect in of our its work.
Q Green Cross International is an NGO with primarily environmental
concerns, - typified by the organisation’s "Legacy"
programme". From that standpoint, how would you rate the
achievements of the Convention WC and the OPCW to date?
A Well, one has to be first very clear ,that the CWC is a
disarmament treaty and not an environmental agreement. However,
the Convention mentions that destruction projects should comply
with national environmental regulations. Although this is would
be in principal good news in principle, however I am a bit concerned
about whether this can be is enforced in reality. For the United
States and the Russian Federation we have a pretty good understanding
of what kind of environmental safeguards are in place, taken,but
for from the other two States Parties that have declared possession
of chemical weapons, however, nothing is known. In view of past
Cold War history and the environmental legacyies that has resulted
ing from excessive secrecy during the Cold War, this is rather
disconcerting.
Q As you are aware, one of the main goals of the OPCW is
to attain universality of the CWC. What role do you feel that
NGOs in general, and Green Cross in particular, can play in assisting
the OPCW to reach that goal?
A One important role could be in helping to make chemical
weapons a public issue. As long as the question of these weapons
are only a question is dealt with by just three or four 3-4 bureaucrats
in each country and not a public issue, it will remain difficult
to obtainprovide the finances necessary finances for their destruction
and for ongoing industry verification, and also to generate have
the public pressure creating a psychological barrier against
their use, for example, in e.g. terrorist actions. A good example
of what public awareness can achieve is the 1997 Land mine Ban
Treaty, which was finally was concluded because of the increasing
public concern.
Another service provided by Green Cross is can be to act as
a neutral and independent third party in controversial questions,
and to provide open and credible information. Only if all these
elements are present, will it be possible to create the necessary
trust between among the different stakeholders. will be created.
Otherwise you have a risk to ending up, sooner or later, in confrontation,
thus stalling or killing the process. In principle, the OPCW
has is in principal having a neutral role, but its mandate is
pretty narrow, i.e. it cannot act on questions outside the Convention,
even if they have a direct impact on implementation. Also, nd
the OPCW will always be a bit restrained in its activities, as
it is the servant to more than 130 and more masters.
Q You have suggested that the Convention’s deadlines
established by the CWC for the total destruction of chemical
weapons arsenals (2007) are is unrealistic. Why do at makes you
say that? Don’t you agree that it wasis necessary to build
some degree of urgency into the destruction of these weapons?CW.
A I’d wish we could simply destroy these weapons in a
few years, but when the Convention WC was negotiated the complexity
of safe methods of destruction was probably underestimated. There
are quite a few reasons why hich make me I believe that we cannot
meet even hold the 2012 deadline, but here . I will state just
only want to name two. First, One reason is that I do not see
enough political interest to push forward implementation and
to come up with the substantial financial means that will be
necessary. This does not mean that politicians are against the
CWC, but simply that there are just more urgent issues on their
agenda. The second Another reason is simply the time that is
needed to plan, build, operate and then decommission a destruction
facilityCWDF. Experience in the United States has showns that
this process takes at least 15 years per facility. Today, many
facilities worldwide are just still in the planning or early
construction phase.
Q The question of CW the destruction of the in Russian
chemical weapons stockpiles remains for the most part unresolved.
Although While other States have made given significant contributions
donations to this monumental project in Russia, you say they
have "barely scratched kimmed the surface.". What then
is the solution to "‘the Russian problem"?’
A A successful Russian destruction programme is certainly
key for the credibility of the CWC. You can have long philosophical
discussions about who should have to pay for the destruction
of this gigantic arsenal. In my opinion, if we want to ensure
the implement a credibility of thle CWC, then we all have to
share the burden. Therefore, I see that at least four key steps
are needed in the immediate future:
(2) the Russian Duma must allocate sufficient funds to more actively support infrastructure development in Shchuch’ye Schouchie, and to asensure funding for of the facility operation over its entire lifetime. This means spells out to a financial commitment of at least $20—-25 million Mio. USD per year;.
(3) the Russian government must provide both clear national programme leadership and better support for to foreign support programmes. It should also stress the . importance must also be paid to the of accountability and transparency of the flows of international finances; and
(4) finally, the European countries, either be it bilaterally or through the European Union, as well as other States Parties to the CWC signatories, must also bear some of the cost burden for Shchuch’ye Schouchie and the other six Russian CW stockpile sites, and provideing a reasonable match to the US efforts.
The A failure of the Russian destruction programme would seriously undermine the spirit of the CWC, including all the positive new elements it has introduced into disarmament. This will clearly have serious implications for future disarmament negotiations and multilateral efforts to stop prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Q The activities of the OPCW are governed by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which deals exclusively with the activities of Member States. That restriction can of course lead to some current issues being ignored. Is this where the OPCW could benefit from the activities of the NGOs?
A I think that not only the OPCW but also the States Parties can benefit from NGOs. In my experience, is that NGOs usually NGOs have a more complete network with all stakeholders, more up-to-date information, and sometimes also a larger view of all the issues involved. For example, I see e.g. that most many European countries involved in Russia contact me in regularly intervals in order to get a third-party opinion on what the situation is and what is needed, because Green Cross has we have access to non-unofficial information and also know the local stakeholders.
Also, because we are an NGO, we are sometimes given information that which would not be given to other States Parties., We are sometimes used as an informal communication channel, or are even asked to articulatepronounce aloud ideas that the which a government cannot do itself.
Last, but not least, NGOs have access to additional sources of funding that may not be available accessible to governments, such as charitable like foundations or and private donors. This would In many cases, such funding can help us to in addressing issues that might otherwise be the neglected. current issues you mention above. Governments have more problems in reacting flexibly on these issues, as they usually are restricted by their parliamentaryian mandates.
Q The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), for various reasons, does not seem to be enjoying the same success asthat the CWC has, and yet biological weapons ought to have similar importance to the world’s nations. Is the BWC a major concern for Green Cross, and how would your organisation seek to influence its development?
A First, I want to stress, that Green Cross is a co-operative and not a confrontational organisation, and that we see our role as in facilitating on of the practical realisation, and not negotiation, of treaties. This means, that we essentially become involved when parties have already agreed in principle to disarm and to renounce certain types of weapons, but then have problems with the practical implementation. I’ am not sure whether there is such a general agreement in the biological field as there is in the chemical field. We have not yet found a niche where our involvement could make a meaningful difference. , However, biological weapons BWs are an item on our agenda and periodically we reassess periodically where we could be most useful in contributing to a the successful implementation of the BWC.
Dr Stephan Robinson
Dr Stephan Robinson holds a PhD in nuclear physics from Basel University. During his compulsory army service he worked in NC-defence, and since 1994, he has been with Green Cross International as Co-ordinator of the Legacy Programme. In this capacity he has had the opportunity to meet with all of the various groups involved in chemical demilitarisation at the global level, from governments to individual citizens. In the few moments he is not working, he plays Balkan folk music with his band and gives regular concerts.
This next article I've included because they mention Green Cross under Switzerland…
Destruction of Chemical Weapons and Demilitarisation of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities: International Assistance to Russia
By Dr Valery V. Semin
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Dr Valery V. Semin Valery Semin is currently the Principal counsellor and Head of the International Assistance Office in the Ministry for the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Previously, he served as the Consul for Scientific Affairs at the Russian Consulate in San Francisco, USA, and prior to that, as a Department Head at Tula State University in Russia. Dr Semin holds bachelors, masters, and doctorate degrees from Tula State University in mechanical engineering, and a DSc from the Blagonravov Mechanical Engineering Institute. He has published widely in Russian and international journals and holds Russian patents on 15 inventions.
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Before signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and again before ratifying it, Russia repeatedly warned that, given its difficult economic situation, its political will to actively participate in the chemical disarmament process could be realised only with sizeable support from the international community. The leaders of several industrially developed Western countries pledged to provide such assistance.
More than seven years have passed since the signing of the CWC, and more than two years have now elapsed since Russia became a fully-fledged member of the OPCW. What is the current status of international assistance for the destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons in Russia? As of 20 May of this year the total amount of gratuitous assistance pledged for this purpose amounted to US$ 370 million, while only US$ 240 million of this amount has actually been allocated so far. Experts believe that the total cost of destroying the Russian chemical weapons arsenal stands at approximately US$ 6 billion. In other words, the international assistance currently available to Russia amounts to merely 6% of the required total amount. Moreover, the foreign donors use part of the funds allocated by them to finance their own administrative and technical costs associated with the implementation of the chemical destruction assistance programmes.
Therefore, if it is to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles within the timelines stipulated by the CWC, Russia must allocate US$ 950 million annually from its budget to fully implement the corresponding federal programme by 2007, or US$ 475 million annually, if the deadline to destroy its CW stockpiles is extended until 2012.
Status of the US Assistance Programme
Since 1992, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement (otherwise known as the Nunn-Lugar Programme), the USA has been assisting Russia in its efforts to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles and demilitarise its former chemical weapons production facilities. The total amount of pledged assistance is US$ 300.5 million. As of 20 May 2000, US$ 192.1 million of this amount had been allocated.
The US has provided assistance in the following three major areas:
Assistance in the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in the town of Shchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region. The US funds were to be used to finance initial phase construction works. So far Russia has prepared the justification of investments and the feasibility study for this facility. In cooperation with American experts, we evaluated the two-stage chemical weapons destruction process developed by Russian scientists. We are currently focusing on designing and manufacturing chemical munitions dismantlement process lines, as well as on scaling up the chemical weapons destruction process for the facility in Shchuch’ye. Parsons (Pasadena, USA), a well-known engineering and construction company, is acting as the US general contractor. However, the actual construction work has not yet started, and is not likely to start in the foreseeable future.
Assistance in the demilitarisation of former chemical weapons production facilities. Aid is being provided for the "Khimprom" ("chemical production") facilities in the cities of Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk.
The Establishment of a central analytical laboratory to control activities in the field of chemical disarmament laboratory operates on the premises of the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow, the leading researcher and developer of chemical weapons destruction technologies.
The efficiency of the Nunn-Lugar Programme is sometimes affected by the pragmatism of our American counterparts (including their attempts to occasionally use this assistance package as a lever to bring political pressure to bear upon Russia in the area of disarmament in general), as well as by the red tape which our projects have to cut through to obtain clearances from the relevant US executive and legislative bodies. Each Defence Appropriation Act related to this programme generally contains over a dozen various conditions and provisions which have the effect of slowing down the flow of funds into assistance projects. The fact that assistance packages have to be approved by the US Congress on an annual basis for each fiscal year hinders long-term planning, as there is no certainty from one year to the next that work which has already commenced will in fact be continued. Assistance is in the form of services provided by American companies, and of supplies of American equipment which is sometimes incompatible with equipment manufactured in Russia. The total amount of pledged assistance does not always tally with the actual allocations, which are considerably more modest. A significant portion of the allocated funds goes to finance the administrative and technical expenses of the American side, while in other cases the funds remain unclaimed for a variety of reasons.
Nevertheless, the USA remains the largest international donor for the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme. In June 1999, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement was extended for another seven-year term by a Protocol, now awaiting ratification by the State Duma. Even if the ratification process for this Protocol were to take longer than is currently expected, this would be solely attributable to unexpected procedural difficulties.
The resolution passed by the US Congress, in October 1999, to suspend funding for the construction of the Shchuch’ye facility has led to serious complications. The official reasons quoted in the resolution include insufficient funding by Russia for the construction of social infrastructure facilities in Shchuch’ye, delays in the allocation of land for the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility there, and a reconsideration of the previous US assessment of the threat posed by Russian chemical weapons to US national security. Russia has grave concerns about this resolution, since it may have, and already has, adversely affected the attitudes of a number of potential donor countries to the provision of assistance to Russia. As a result, Russia may be unable to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles and to meet the deadline determined by the CWC. We have complied with most of the conditions stipulated by the US Congress, and have reason to hope that the funding of this programme will be restored in the next fiscal year, FY-2001. However, the final decision is not ours to make.
Cooperation with European Countries
The Federal Republic of Germany has been providing assistance for chemical destruction in Russia since October 1993. The total amount of assistance allocated so far has been DEM 58.5 million. Substantial work has been carried out under this programme to manufacture, test and deliver technological equipment to the chemical weapons destruction facility in the Settlement of Gorny, in the Saratov region, where construction is now nearing completion.
Within the framework of our joint programme with Sweden, initiated in 1993, the risk assessment of the chemical weapons storage facility in the settlement of Kambarka, in the Republic of Udmurtia, has been carried out. A Public Outreach Centre has been set up there, and medical equipment has been supplied to the local hospital. The total amount of assistance provided under this programme so far is SEK 4.4 million.
Finland is about to embark on an assistance programme that will include the delivery of an environmental monitoring system to the chemical weapons storage facility in the settlement of Kambarka. The total amount of assistance so far is FIM 6 million.
The European Union has allocated funds to finance the demilitarisation of former chemical weapons production facilities in Dzerzhinsk, in the Nizhni Novgorod region, and in Novocheboksarsk, in the Republic of Chuvashia, as well as the construction of the main CW destruction building and an environmental monitoring system at the chemical weapons destruction facility in Gorny, in the Saratov region. The total amount of assistance so far is EUR 15.9 million.
In late 1998 we signed an agreement with the Netherlands for the provision of assistance in the amount of NLG 25 million. The funds will be used to provide technological equipment for soil improvement at the Kambarka facility, and to finance the construction of some other top priority Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities.
Italy has appropriated ITL 15 billion to assist Russia in the construction of social and engineering infrastructure facilities in the settlement of Kizner, in the Republic of Udmurtia, and in the town of Shchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region.
Switzerland has been providing assistance by financing public outreach projects implemented in the areas in which chemical weapons destruction facilities are to be located. Approximately US$ 300,000 have been spent over the last three years. Those funds have been used to conduct public hearings in chemical weapons storage areas, to establish information centres, to publish brochures for the local population providing relevant information on chemical weapons destruction facilities to be built near the chemical weapons facilities, and to conduct research to assess the state of health of the local population, and the state of the environment in the chemical weapons storage areas. This programme, implemented with the active involvement of the International Green Cross, has helped to form positive attitudes concerning the problem of chemical weapons destruction.
Problems Related to the Implementation of Assistance Programmes
Analysis of Russia’s experience of the implementation of international assistance programmes has helped us to identify a number of problems that reduce the efficiency of these efforts. Firstly, there are differences between national legislation in different States Parties to the Convention. The need to resolve legal issues slows down negotiations on legal frameworks, as, for example, during the preparation of assistance agreements with both the Netherlands and Finland.
Secondly, in several cases problems arose due to loopholes in the Russian legislation, which lacked the requisite legal norms. In this context, in May 1998, the Russian State Duma passed a new law and granted tax exemption status to foreign technical assistance projects, thus eliminating a number of barriers in this area. However, our legislation still needs some fine-tuning to create a favourable environment for foreign private and corporate investors who might finance chemical disarmament programmes in the relevant Russian regions.
Thirdly, there is a lack of coordination between Russia and the donor states in the area of chemical weapons destruction. For instance Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden finance projects currently being implemented in Kambarka, in the Republic of Udmurtia. Germany has focused its efforts on the facility in Gorny, in the Saratov region, The USA is working in Shchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region, while Italy plans to become involved in the construction of several infrastructure facilities in Kizner, in the Republic of Udmurtia. As a result of this, social and engineering infrastructure facilities are currently scheduled for construction in Kambarka and Kizner, while Russia’s current priorities also include the Gorny and Shchuch’ye facilities. This has led to a regrettable lack of consistency in the application of international assistance funds.
In this regard, Mr José Bustani, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), made an important proposal when he suggested the creation of a permanent coordination committee on international assistance to Russia, in order to boost its efforts to fulfil its obligations under the Convention in a timely manner. The committee is intended to coordinate the work being done by the current donors, and also to attract other OPCW States Parties to cooperate in this area. It is envisaged that the committee will consist of representatives of the relevant Russian agencies and the donor states. Representatives of potential donors may also participate in the work of this committee, as observers. The committee will seek to promote exchanges of information relating to the implementation of assistance programmes, as well as to coordinate donor efforts in Russia, and to direct the funds allocated by donors to finance the highest priority components of the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme. As Russia is prepared to conduct consultations on the composition, functions, and procedures of the committee, the proposal of the OPCW Director-General can therefore be implemented within the shortest possible time.
Fourthly, the involvement of new donor countries in the assistance effort was previously hampered by insufficient transparency in the implementation of the Russian chemical weapons stockpiles destruction programme, and by the fragmentary nature of Russian proposals related to the highest priority assistance projects. These issues were largely resolved in the course of three conferences of donor countries held in the period 1998 - 2000 in The Hague and Moscow, with facilitation by the European Union, the Netherlands, and the OPCW. These events led to a deeper understanding by the donor states of the problems faced by Russia, and encouraged new donors to join the assistance effort. For example, Canada and Norway voiced their desire to provide assistance to Russia during the most recent conference in The Hague in March, 2000.
Alternative Assistance Programmes
On the basis of Russia’s experience, it has concluded that the gratuitous assistance provided by foreign countries is limited to an extent which renders it inconsistent with the magnitude of the tasks which it aims to resolve. If we are to attain more tangible results, we need to secure the participation of the international financial community in this programme. This participation could take various forms, including the provision to Russia of large, very long-term loans on favourable terms (some loans could even be interest-free) by international financial and credit institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, etc. It could also involve some or all of the following: the granting of access to funds allocated under special-purpose programmes run by the governments and some private foundations; the encouragement of private and corporate investment in areas in which chemical weapons destruction facilities are scheduled for construction, and investment into former chemical weapons production facilities; the restructuring and annulment of a proportion of Russian debt to creditor countries and major holders of its debt securities (G-7 states, leading members of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris and London Creditor Clubs), provided that any such debt relief funds are used solely to finance the chemical disarmament effort in Russia. We believe that we are entitled to international support for the resolution of these issues. By voluntarily assuming an obligation to destroy, over a period of 10 years, 40,000 tons of chemical warfare agents stockpiled by the former Soviet Union, Russia has undertaken to solve a global problem which transcends purely national boundaries, and which has implications for the entire international community.
The achievement of this objective will require Russian government agencies and local administrations involved in chemical destruction to conduct additional analysis and to focus on creating a favourable investment climate, primarily through coordinating both its programmes aimed at the destruction of chemical weapons and its demilitarisation of former chemical weapons production facilities, as well as through coordinating regional economic development plans. It is also necessary for Russia to carefully examine the opportunities presented by the existing programmes of foundations and international financial institutions, with a view to providing funds for the construction of social and engineering facilities in the chemical weapons destruction facility areas. To do this, Russia may need to establish a specialised centre to analyse its options for increasing the amount of international assistance, and to coordinate its efforts in this critically important area.
Conclusion
Although Russia has shown the political will to fulfil its commitment to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles within the timelines set by the Convention, and notwithstanding the fact that the interested government agencies are doing everything in their power to secure sufficient funds to finance this extremely expensive programme, the possibility cannot be ruled out that it may be unsuccessful in its attempt to significantly increase the amount of foreign assistance in this area. The relative quiescence of industrially developed nations in helping Russia to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles, and recent developments in US policy which appear to aim at a reduction in such assistance, may compel Russia to reluctantly consider an extension of its chemical weapons destruction deadline which is in line with its own financial capabilities.
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